Myanmar faces regular digital repression by the military and challenges such as surveillance, doxxing and security threats. Despite these challenges, people in Myanmar are finding ways to resist and mitigate risks by using digital security tools, alternative communication methods and community-driven solutions.
In this scenario, the Myanmar Internet Project (MIP) recently participated in Digital Rights in Asia Pacific (DRAPAC) and the Asia Pacific Internet Governance Forum (AprIGF) with support from the APC Members Engagement and Travel Fund (METF). We participated in panels and roundtable discussions, addressing the digital challenges and resistance efforts in Myanmar, as well as strategies for mitigating associated risks and obstacles.
The MIP hosted a panel discussion, titled “Digital Struggle and Resistance in the Myanmar Revolution” at DRAPAC 2024, moderated by Yin Maung from EngageMedia. The distinguished panellists included Bradley, senior analyst at MIP; Stan, EdTech director at Burma Academy, and Gar, a senior analyst at MIP. The event also featured an introductory speech by Nan Lin, a prominent young activist and my friend from Myanmar.
The daily digital resistance of a youth activist in Myanmar
The panel’s opening speech, pre-recorded by Lin himself, provided a reality check with the question, “Have you ever had your devices checked or taken while working, or searched as you were going out?” He highlighted the everyday challenges people in Myanmar face, where there are no laws protecting their privacy or dignity, leaving citizens vulnerable to such invasive actions. He emphasised the lack of freedom of expression, explaining that a mere photo on your phone, a text message to a friend, or a social media post could lead to arrest by the military junta. Depending on the circumstances, you might either bribe your way out, or face days or months of interrogation, torture in their camps, and eventually be sent to prison. In some cases, you can be forcibly conscripted into the army. This is how they persecute citizens every single day after the recent coup, he said.
He explained how the dictatorship’s oppressive mechanisms are brutal and filthy, even as the resistance forces and public are brave and clever in standing up to them. They are fighting for freedom and justice. The Myanmar Spring Revolution began as a civil resistance movement that later transformed into armed resistance. Lin believes both forms must work together strategically and in harmony. More than three years have passed since the coup, and digital platforms have played a key role in the revolution, with efforts to mobilise and build networks on Facebook, Twitter/X, Zoom, Signal and Telegram to coordinate protests.
He also described how digital platforms are used to gather donations for the resistance. Revolutionary media channels also earn money through viewer clicks and interactions, which helps support the movement. In many regions, perhaps half of the country, the military junta has cut off internet access to disrupt communication. However, alternative methods have been found to stay connected, such as satellite internet services like Starlink.
He explained that since the coup, the State Administrative Council (SAC) has blocked thousands of websites, raised the internet costs, and banned VPNs, making it difficult for people to access information and mobilise online. Many young people in Myanmar use multiple VPNs, despite the risk of arrest, as accessing the internet without them is nearly impossible. The situation has worsened with Facebook’s policy changes on social and political content and the VPN ban. Lin avoids phone calls due to surveillance concerns and uses encrypted applications like Signal; he is constantly worried about his location being traced and exposed. He concluded his speech saying that dictators will relentlessly impose oppression, using brutal methods and committing crimes against humanity to protect their power until the very end. However, he affirmed that the resistance will continue to fight until it prevails.
Digital repression in Myanmar
At the panel, the MIP highlighted the extensive military surveillance both before and after the 2021 military coup. Social media platforms like Facebook were weaponised to spread hate speech, disinformation and propaganda, targeting the Rohingya and other minority groups in Myanmar. Prolonged internet shutdowns occurred in the western regions where the Myanmar military and the ethnic army clashed. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, the government amended the Electronic Transactions Law and later, during the pandemic, citing the spread of fake news, it blocked over 200 websites, including ethnic and mainstream media sites. It also drafted a cybersecurity law claiming to protect citizens’ privacy and security. Under the guise of the smart city project, the government installed CCTVs across major cities, supposedly for traffic control. Additionally, it acquired digital surveillance tools for use by special police forces and cyber police, as documented in government budget files. For example, Cellebrite software was used to investigate political activists and journalists as early as 2018. The panellists emphasised the need for international stakeholder involvement to mitigate surveillance by such authoritarian regimes.
After the coup, internet blackouts and selective shutdowns became more frequent, with access restricted through a whitelist system, where VPNs became a tool of necessity for the people. Social media weaponisation, particularly on platforms such as TikTok and Telegram, has intensified, with military propaganda, targeted harassment and doxxing becoming widespread. Major telecom companies have exited the country, and the military has ordered surveillance equipment to be installed in the telecom infrastructure. The government amended laws, such as the Electronic Transactions Law and the law protecting citizens’ privacy and security, to allow arbitrary search of users’ devices without court warrants. Additionally, it inserted interception powers into the existing counterterrorism law. In an urgent move, a new draft of cyber security law was introduced, which includes provisions to criminalise the use of VPNs. Mandatory SIM registration is being hastily enforced and electronic identity database systems are being introduced, which require citizens to switch to smart IDs in areas under military control as part of pilot programmes. There are also threats from spyware and malware, such as Mustang Panda, targeting civil society organisations and the National Unity Government (NUG), the country’s government in exile. The most recent threat, apart from banning VPNs, is deploying the latest surveillance technologies, such as firewalls and network behavioural profiling.
The panellists concluded by referencing Steven Feldstein’s book “The Rise of Digital Repression: How Technology is Reshaping Power, Politics, and Resistance” (2021), noting that the Myanmar military employs a comprehensive array of digital repression techniques, including internet shutdowns, censorship, targeted persecution of online users, spread of manipulated information and disinformation, and extensive surveillance.
Internet inaccessibility and alternative communication
Another MIP representative at the meeting discussed alternative communication methods in response to internet inaccessibility. Internet shutdowns vary, and they include pre-emptive cuts before conflicts, partial shutdowns affecting 3G data, and bandwidth throttling, with disruptions differing from one telecom operator to another. As of December 2021, Reuters had reported over 400 mobile towers destroyed. Restoration is expensive and politically sensitive in conflict zones, with additional challenges of lack of technical expertise, and resources controlled by ethnic armed groups. The panellists agreed on the need to acknowledge that mobile towers are being destroyed by different actors depending on the conflict. These include revolutionary forces looking for materials to fashion weapons and shelter.
Accessing the internet from one’s own private space has become a luxury and access to information could well be a matter of life and death in Myanmar. For example, internally displaced camps (IDPs) rely on timely information about airstrike and battle information, while those in conflict zones depend on the internet for emergency medical assistance.
In areas controlled by ethnic armed groups and liberated zones without internet access, people rely on FM radio and the print media for information. For communication, some rely on handheld transceivers, while others use range extenders placed in high areas to capture spillover mobile data. Using long-range mesh network and satellite communications remains the only viable option, especially Starlink. Though it is logistically challenging and costly, Starlink provides crucial connectivity in these remote regions.
The panellist finished by stating the need for community-owned mesh networks and noted that funding for alternative communication is rarely provided. He emphasised that the current network must transition from a small office home office (SOHO) scale to community network-level for sustainability.
The panellists agreed on the need to explore resilient and sustainable alternative communications such as community networks, going beyond relying on Starlink.
The vital role of internet access, ensuring the right to education
A representative from Burma Academy briefly discussed the post-coup educational landscape. Due to widespread boycott of the military junta and participation in the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), many high school and university students have left the formal education system in protest of the dictatorship. According to the charity Children of the Mekong, basic education enrolment dropped 80% within two years of the coup, leaving 7.8 million students out of school. Digital education has emerged as a viable solution to address the crisis.
Burma Academy is a non-profit, youth-led EdTech initiative founded after the coup, alongside other informal digital education platforms. Committed to the belief that education should be free for all, it aims to provide alternative access to learning through digital technology. Its courses follow the massive open online courses (MOOC) model and are freely accessible via its mobile application, with downloaded resources for areas with unstable internet access. Burma Academy has also piloted the use of Raspberry pi devices for offline learning, designed for regions with complete internet shutdowns. Additionally, hybrid learning centres have been established in some liberated areas where internet access is available. Its website has been banned and censored by the military’s State Administration Council (SAC), requiring students to use VPNs for access. However, the recent ban on VPNs has further restricted students’ ability to reach the platform. The digital divide remains a significant challenge with internet shutdowns, high mobile data costs, device requirements, heavy censorship and limited access exacerbating the barriers to education.
The representative concluded that while global e-learning trends are on the rise, Myanmar still needs to prioritise gaining internet access. Fostering internet access is directly tied to ensuring the right to education in Myanmar, and the country risks falling behind globally if this issue is not addressed.
Taking forward several issues regarding digital access
The participants raised questions and urgent concerns, some of which included:
- The use of Starlink satellite internet in non-regulated areas and issues with roaming.
- The criminalisation of Starlink in neighbouring countries like Thailand, posing further challenges.
- The destruction of mobile towers and identifying those responsible
- Advocacy by cloud-based companies for VPN servers
- Digital security risks associated with the deployment of new surveillance technologies.
The panel highlighted the real challenges faced by activists still inside Myanmar. The military is steering the country towards full state surveillance, similar to other digital authoritarian regimes, while citizens are actively resisting by adopting alternative communication methods.
We hope the discussion managed to highlight the urgent need for global attention and support to protect digital rights in Myanmar. As the junta continues to escalate its repressive tactics, international and regional cooperation and advocacy for internet freedoms are vital. Our digital rights community’s ongoing efforts provide a glimpse of hope in a cyberscape filled with risks, and their work remains crucial to ensure that the people of Myanmar can continue to resist, connect and fight for our future.
Image: Local youngsters in Myanmar enjoy satellite internet at a bomb shelter, by Nyein Chan May via MIP (CC BY-NC-SA).
Gar, a senior analyst with the Myanmar Internet Project, brings over a decade of expertise in tech accountability and surveillance. She actively provides digital security training and policy guidance, while her research delves into the intersection of technology, gender, trust and safety.