The adoption in September of the Global Digital Compact (GDC) – a new multilateral framework for global digital cooperation towards “an inclusive, open, sustainable, fair, safe and secure digital future for all” – has been met with a cautious response from many in civil society. Cautious, because despite positive outcomes in the final text, there are also oversights, omissions, and problems with framing that we feel are fundamental to a just digital future.
As a way of reviewing where these gaps are, it is useful to look back at what we wanted out of the process a year ago, and where the gaps emerged. This is important because the implementation phases that lie ahead are as crucial as the negotiation process that led to the final text being adopted. There will be new opportunities for civil society to influence the outcomes of the Compact, and perhaps to help push the impact of the GDC closer towards some of the goals we previously envisaged.
What we wanted
As a new framework for shaping our digital future, there were six key areas that the Association for Progressive Communications (APC), together with its advocacy partners, wanted the Compact to address. These were:
Digital inclusion: We called for the greater participation of communities in policy making; regulatory frameworks that allowed for the diversification of connectivity providers in the access ecosystem, such as the different kinds of community-centred connectivity networks that are possible; and financing mechanisms that catalysed meaningful connectivity solutions at the community level as crucial to address digital inequity.
Human rights online: We called for a strengthening of the use of human rights law in all operations of the internet. We insisted that the internet must be governed and regulated on the legal and normative foundations of human rights standards, and adhere to the principles of necessity and proportionality. The accountability and transparency of states and corporations were and are important to us. Key issues for us were the need to address structural inequalities and strengthen democracy, embracing a wide range of human rights in the understanding that a development-oriented digital future can only be enabled where offline and online environments respect rights.
Data protection: Our key concern here was the massive harvesting of personal data by big tech corporations, and intrusive state surveillance. We were also concerned about the gendered aspect of this data harvesting. We wanted stronger data protection regimes, better transparency and legal limitations on surveillance and data collection, and strengthened anonymity and encryption tools and permissions on platforms. Feminist and intersectional approaches to data protection and privacy were important to us, as was enabling Indigenous communities to steward their data. We also felt it was important to bring an angle of economic and social equality to the governance of data.
The circulation of harmful and misleading content: Here we called for better accountability mechanisms for both tech companies and states to address online discrimination and the circulation of hate speech and disinformation and misinformation. As in the case of gendered disinformation, harmful and misleading content are often the same thing. Efforts at tackling the problems where they exist often vary from platform to platform, and rules are often applied differently in different contexts and to different people. The lack of consistent industry-wide standards and the poor application of existing standards are not new problems. We wanted a better alignment of content moderation systems with human rights standards. With respect to states, we were concerned that in many cases they have an even poorer record in communicating trustworthy information, protecting, promoting and respecting freedom of expression, and ensuring an open, diverse and plural online environment.
A gender-just digital society: In our joint submission to the GDC and in our various interventions throughout the process to build the Compact, we insisted that it recognise the differentiated impact that the internet and digital technologies have on women, girls and people of diverse genders and sexualities. The GDC’s objective of “an inclusive, open, sustainable, fair, safe and secure digital future for all” needed to be infused with an intersectional feminist perspective to ensure that the ongoing digital transformation of our economies and societies can usher in a gender-just world that is affirming to all individuals and their path to self-actualisation. This meant recognising systemic gender-based discrimination, and the similar systemic and structural injustices in the digital society, which were sustained in numerous ways by the operations of big tech companies. Key areas of concern were digital access; the inclusion of feminists and people of diverse genders and sexualities in governance and other processes; self-determination; freedom of expression and anonymity; technology-facilitated gender-based violence (TFGBV) and exploitation; digital safety and security; privacy; and the transparency and accountability of algorithms and new artificial intelligence (AI) systems. We grounded our advocacy work in the Feminist Principles of the Internet.
Earth justice and sustainable development: In a second joint submission, we called for a foregrounding of the precautionary principle in digitalisation processes. A circular economy approach to the design, production and deployment of digital technologies was for us an important guiding principle. We also wanted private companies to prioritise transparency and meaningful access to information relevant to the socio-environmental impacts of their operations and planned technology development. Commitments from both government and the private sector that supported environmental stewardship in communities and community-led connectivity initiatives that respected planetary boundaries and the rights of nature were important.
The gaps
The extent to which many of these concerns were not properly addressed in the final text of the GDC is clear. There are significant gaps in many of the areas that were key advocacy “asks” outlined above, and new areas that needed attention emerged during our process of engaging with the GDC and working with our civil society partners and allies. The weaknesses are in five areas that, together with other organisations, we had identified prior to the adoption of the final text:
Human rights: Despite our foregrounding in several ways of the importance of international human rights law in all operations of the internet, the obligations of states under human rights law are not sufficiently robust nor consistently mainstreamed throughout the text. For example, softer references to “international law” are made, rather than the stronger “international human rights law”. The text also fails to recognise the need for states to refrain from the use of mass surveillance and ensure that targeted surveillance technologies are only used in compliance with the principles of legality, legitimacy, necessity and proportionality. The development of new technologies such as AI is a concern for us. There is an inconsistency in the text in the application of human rights obligations across the whole life cycle of technologies such as AI, including their conception and design, which sets the frame for their particular application, and how they can be used. In particular, we do not see restrictions on states and technology companies using new and emerging digital technologies that are fundamentally incompatible with international human rights or that pose undue risks to the enjoyment of human rights.
We have also raised concerns about the inadequate support for the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Although we did not specifically raise the function of the OHCHR in our initial submissions, alongside our civil society partners and allies we noted that the Compact effectively weakens the work of the commissioner whose work is dependent on a voluntary funding mechanism that is available “upon request”. The OHCHR has done extensive and important work on technology, business and human rights and we feel the Office is a vital mechanism for holding states and businesses to account within the human rights framework.
Inclusive internet governance: In multiple ways in our submissions we emphasised that a just digital society was dependent on inclusive internet governance processes. For us, the multistakeholder approach, a foundational element of effective internet governance, is very much at stake in the GDC process. Yet civil society, academia, the private sector, the technical community and grassroots affected communities (both those marginalised from and the “beneficiaries” of these sorts of processes) are problematically not included meaningfully in consultations relating to the design or functioning of proposed new bodies and mechanisms, nor in the follow-up or implementation of the GDC (see paragraphs 55, 56, 62 and 72). We remain concerned that the GDC enables the centralisation and nationalisation of internet governance through existing state structures, which inherently risks privileging the private sector, without explicitly calling on other non-state actors, particularly civil society and the technical community, in its call to action. To this end, we have called for proposals for new bodies and mechanisms to be preceded by meaningful multistakeholder consultation and that the multistakeholder approach underpin the design and functioning of any new bodies and mechanisms. This should also apply to developing financing initiatives and digital public infrastructure, which often promote the adoption of technologies directed at maximising data collection.
In this context there are two issues that we need to raise. Firstly, we believe that the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) process, including the Internet Governance Forum (IGF), requires greater recognition and support in the final text. Secondly, the centralisation of internet and digital governance in New York is problematic. This limits the participation of civil society and remote and marginalised communities across the globe in terms of resources and administrative challenges such as visa restrictions. For the past 20 years, our digital future has been discussed in UN institutions and multistakeholder forums that have allowed a wide range of states, civil society actors and other stakeholders to be active participants. Moving discussions to New York, and centralising these in the Office of the Secretary-General’s Envoy on Technology, will fundamentally change this dynamic, and worsen the development and rights-based outcomes of any processes and mechanisms developed.
Privacy, anonymity and end-to-end encryption: As we pointed out in our submissions, privacy protocols needed to be drastically strengthened, alongside the security and confidentiality of digital communications. However, there is little acknowledgement in the text of the need for states to promote the safety of the digital environment in this way.
Mainstreaming gender: As often happens with these sorts of documents, gender is not sufficiently mainstreamed throughout the text and appears as a stand-alone principle. While we agree that a stand-alone principle is necessary, given that gender discrimination is a systemic issue, gender rights also need to be incorporated in all aspects of policy and programme development. In fact, the reverse was evident. In particular, we noted that some essential references to gender equality were removed. For example, the only reference to “gender equality” in the objective on AI (paragraph 56) was taken out, as well as the reference to the prevention of TFGBV.
Addressing the environmental impact of technologies: Another big challenge is that the GDC takes on a very techno-solutionist approach to the climate crisis and environmental issues. The text mainly considers technology as a tool to address climate change. While this is critical, it takes poor account of the negative impact of tech development and deployment on the environment, or on the human rights of communities affected by the production and disposal of technologies in the context of mass deployment of these technologies globally.
Where to now: Implementation
Some of the deficiencies in the GDC can be remedied in how it is implemented. In this regard, vigilance is needed from civil society over the next few years to ensure that the right approach is taken when setting up the mechanisms, bodies and processes to achieve the goal of an “inclusive, open, sustainable, fair, safe and secure digital future for all”.
From our perspective, there are four cross-cutting areas that need attention:
- Renewed and more robust and effective cooperation among governments, civil society, the private sector and the technical community is needed at all levels. Implementation should also ensure better coordination among UN and other global digital processes and spaces that have been multiplying and at times replicating and even contradicting each other. The GDC does not remedy this fragmentation. Here we see a fundamental role for civil society in actively identifying the links and the knowledge and process gaps between the GDC and processes such as WSIS+20, the IGF and Beijing+30. There are many others, such as the increasingly complex domain of cybersecurity, where APC has been advocating for a holistic gender approach to standards settings and design, as well as what is likely to become a proliferation of spaces where AI will be addressed in the future, despite the multidisciplinary Independent International Scientific Panel on AI proposed by the GDC. As we have pointed out, trade negotiations, consumer forums, and areas such as food security, labour rights, intellectual property law and climate justice are also important. Big tech’s investment in nuclear power to drive their data centres, or Google’s investments in AgTech show how important this cross-field advocacy is. What happens in those forums, fields and sectors with respect to digital rights will influence the impact of the GDC.
- Human rights in their interaction with development needs to be reaffirmed as the cornerstone of digital policy, putting people at the centre. For us it is key that the implementation of the GDC build on the existing human rights tools and mechanisms and serves to strengthen them in terms of digital standards. The resistance from some states and businesses to do this means that collective strategies by civil society, as in other areas mentioned here, are likely to be necessary.
- We need to ensure that the benefits of digital technologies are equally distributed. Specific attention needs to be paid to the inclusion of groups and communities who are marginalised, excluded and discriminated against in mechanisms, bodies and processes. This will be constant, hard work, and will involve mentoring, shadowing, support and capacity-building programmes that help these groups and communities engage in these processes effectively. Civil society-led mechanisms that allow for regional and inter-regional consultation may be necessary, and capacity building interventions such as APC’s African School on Internet Governance (AfriSIG) need to be strengthened. Connecting the GDC to gender discussions such as Beijing+30 is also key.
- We need to keep a close watch on the exact nature of the financing mechanisms that emerge from the GDC, not just for financing “to connect the remaining 2.6 billion people to the Internet,” but for all other important aspects of the GDC. There is a risk that the preferred model of blended finance and incentives could become increasingly dominated by the private sector, with governments in the global South not contributing to this financing pool. This will allow the private sector to dictate the terms of engagement, and the kinds of roll-out programmes, projects and interventions that emerge from the GDC. It may even strengthen their position as beneficiaries of the incentives. This is especially worrying in the context of universal connectivity, given the failure of the market-first model of connectivity that has left so many behind.
- The implementation of the GDC must take into consideration the role of business as key stakeholders, but not dismiss the fact that the issue of their accountability for harms is still underdeveloped in terms of policy and regulation. This, again, refers back to our point about the funding of the OHCHR, but also to the poor commitment from states to regulate big tech corporations within a human rights framework. This reluctance needs to be constantly challenged and questioned throughout the implementation of the GDC mechanisms, bodies and processes that will bring the framework into effect.
Where we stand
Overall, governments are showing their inability to be sufficiently future-oriented by 1) not taking digital structural inequality and gender justice seriously enough and 2) not putting climate change and sustainability front and centre in deliberations. Countries in the global South have not shown that they have the capacity – and perhaps even the political will – to form a strong enough alliance on bridging digital inequality and addressing structural divides. Their responses to community-led connectivity networks at the G77 illustrate this. Governments from the global South also did not push for stronger language in the GDC that deals with digital exclusion.
The GDC should respond to the complexity of regulatory challenges that plague the digital landscape. This complexity is intersectional and nuanced, and cuts across sectors and fields. Regulators in the global South need to acknowledge this complexity, and country specificities, while working towards harmonising regional legal and other infrastructures to allow better access to the digital economy. Key areas that need attention are the continued lack of meaningful access and connectivity, which, as our work on community networks shows, requires a dexterous, contextualised and rooted response; the alarming rise of TFGBV, which happens in different ways in different communities across the globe; and the risk of AI-related biases and discrimination. Responding to these in different countries may result in similar approaches, and, of course, much can be learned from different experiences. But it is unlikely that a “copy-and-paste” regulatory approach will work in all the cases where there is a need for regulatory change.
There is, at the same time, a bigger picture here. The world is facing an unprecedented climate and environmental emergency and it is paramount to understand the ways in which digital technologies threaten environmental sustainability, but also the constructive role they can play in confronting the crisis. How this role can be constructive and adhere to the human rights and development frameworks is important. Issues of privacy, gender rights and data stewardship will come to the fore, among others, along with the need to address structural barriers. The implementation of the GDC will inevitably be permeated by the success or the failure to mitigate the crisis, while at the same time paying particular attention to the rights of the communities most affected by the inevitable societal changes and upheavals that will be experienced.
The Office of the UN Tech Envoy has opened a call for endorsement of the GDC. A distinction between validating the process (of drafting and negotiating the Compact) and actively participating in implementation must be considered and established, recognising that there is still a lot of progress needed in multistakeholder participation in a way that is meaningful, that empowers civil society, that is partnership-oriented and inclusive, and that recognises that there are political and corporate interests that might be disrupting the implementation of the GDC in many respects. Civil society must be recognised as a legitimate actor with an absolutely essential role to play in applying critical thinking analysis, making the implementation of the Compact meaningful for historically marginalised and excluded communities and groups, and holding powerful actors accountable.